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THE FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES IN
PERSPECTIVE: ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATIONS
IN A POLITICAL SETTNG
Louis L. JAFFE *
The independent administrative agency has been the whipping
boy of the American governmental establishment for the last 20 years.
The usual complaint—at the moment very much emphasized by those
pressing for environmental controls—is that these agencies become
willy-nilly the "captive" of the industries which they are charged with
regulating. President Nixon's recent proposal to consolidate all admin-
istrative powers relevant to environmental control into a new inde-
pendent agency will probably raise once again questions as to the
effectiveness of the agencies. This Symposium reviewing the work in
the last decade of six agencies and of the antitrust division of the
Department of Justice provides useful material for the debate.
In 1954 in an article entitled The Effective Limits of the Admin-
istrative Process: A Reevaluation,' I attempted to make an estimate
of the role of the administrative process particularly as it is exempli-
fied in the independent agency. I came to the conclusion, among other
things, that the charge of industrial or corporate domination of the
agencies was a gross exaggeration. But it has been very difficult to
counter the kind of simplistic thinking which is involved in the claim.
It has been many times pointed out that American liberal and reform
thinking relies heavily on the so-called "devil" theory. The common-
est form of this theory is to attribute the ills of our society to the large
corporations. A subsidiary of the axiom is that when an attempt is
made to control the corporations by a public agency the agency is
captured by them. Such co-option can no doubt take place and has in
particular instances taken place. Indeed, a certain degree of co-option
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is inherent in the whole process of regulation. And the more inclusive
and detailed the regulatory scheme the more this will be true.
The less loaded word for the phenomena of "capture" is coopera-
tion. Two reasons can be given for both the likelihood and even the
propriety of cooperation. The first reason is indeed basic to all legal
systems. A legal system cannot function unless there is a high degree
of symbiosis, of living together and of acceptance. Where the enforce-
ment of law requires the continuous imposition of sanctions against a
hostile constituency the enterprise is apt to fail. Second, where regula-
tion is intensive it inevitably tends to usurp the function of manage-
ment. A government administration will not have the resources for
managing the large enterprises which it regulates, and in fact it is
under no responsibility for a successful issue. If, nevertheless, regula-
tion is carried to the point where private managerial initiatives are
seriously impaired, the enterprise will be robbed of its necessary drive.
It may be surmised that this is what has happened to the railroads.
Indeed, a much greater danger to effective administration than "cap-
ture" is the hardening of administrative policies and the resulting
inflexibility. This, in the opinion of many critics, is the case with the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
It is I think impossible to make out that the ICC has been cap-
tured by anything other than its own rather rigid approach to rate
competition. It is one of the ironies of the debate on this whole sub-
ject that it arose originally out of the hypothesis that the ICC had
been captured by the railroads and that the hypothesis was proposed
at the time when the Commission was putting road-blocks in the way
of effective railroad competition with automobile trucking. The sim-
plistic approach would have told us to substitute the trucks for the
railroads as the captor. But the true analysis, I think, was that the
Commission had developed a so-called planning notion, then very
popular, pursuant to which the entire transporation industry was to
be coordinated. Each mode of transportation was to have its "share".
There is, I think, an argument for the abolition of the Interstate
Commerce Commission—though I dare say this approach too is over-
simplified. At least the contribution to this Symposium discussing the
ICC does nothing to counter the argument for abolition. It shows a
Commission still committed to hampering the railroad's ability to com-
pete by imposing upon its rate structure the theory of fully distributed
costs, and for the rest engaged in a kind of caretaker regulation of a
nearly bankrupt railroad industry. Much of the Commission's energies
these days have been devoted to approving or disapproving (but mostly
approving) railroad consolidations. It is questionable whether this
work requires the service of a standing regulatory commission. One has
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the uneasy feeling that the consolidation movement is a kind of desper-
ate make-shift. Given the absence of any coherent transporation policy
I hasten to add that if these observations appear as a criticism of the
ICC they imply to a far greater degree a criticism of the failure of
our government as a whole to evolve a coherent transporation policy.
My estimate of the railroad regulation situation is only another
expression of my abiding conviction that the criticisms so often made
of administrative agencies should much more often be directed toward
Congress than the agencies. The notion so sedulously cultivated by
many of us during New Deal days that agencies, because they were
expert, could go on spinning out of their own guts a continuing series
of miraculous solutions was an absurd and a-historical illusion. The
stuff of great public policy controversies is basically political and can
only be solved in the political arena.
•	 It is true that in the absence of a congressional solution, particu-
larly where opposing forces are in stalemate, an administrative agency
with a broad delegation of power does have some leverage with which
a brilliant and energetic administrator can solve problems. And, con-
trary to the jaundiced views taken of the agencies, the fact of the
matter is that there have been in the past, and indeed in the recent
past, some striking examples of this phenomenon. Even so maligned
an agency as the Federal Communications Commission has provided
us with some striking examples, as witness its application of the fair-
ness doctrine to require its licensees to broadcast a substantial volume
of anti-cigarette propaganda.
The Symposium provides considerable material for demonstrating
that the "capture" hypothesis is based on a false premise, either
explicit or implied, which among other things obscures the diversity
of administrations both of the independent and the departmental
variety. The treatment of the independent agency as a distinct phe-
nomenon has gone much too far and has confused thinking in the area.
The independent agency does have certain distinct characteristics. Its
so-called independence—which is technically an independence from
the constitutional Executive—has often been thought to weaken rather
than strengthen it. Lacking presidential backing the agency may be
forced into undue dependence upon Congress and its committees. Fur-
thermore, it is thought that the desire for favorable budgetary treat-
ment and for reappointment to positions does introduce a measure of
presidential control. Nevertheless, certain agencies, of which the SEC
is an outstanding example appear to have maintained a very large
independence.
One of the defects of the capture theory is the premise that the
object of regulation is always a more or less gigantic corporate corn-
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bination to whose pressure and power the agency is predominately
subject. This of course is a simplified derivative of the classic Marxian
analysis. It either overlooks or denies the fact that even granting the
very great power of the industrial corporations there are other groups,
some of them organized and some not, which demonstratively possess
a very great power. The farm and union organizations are prime
examples. The article on the National Labor Relations Board docu-
ments the proposition that union pressure for the extension of union
bargaining is persistent and effective, though one should make no claim
that it is the only force to which the Board is responsible. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, however, amply testifies to the power
of the unorganized investor interest. The Federal Power Commission,
as it appears from the article describing its recent activities, has been
quite responsive to consumer pressure, perhaps, as recent events sug-
gest, to the point where it has failed to allow returns to the industry
sufficient to maintain the needed level of exploration and investment.
It may be argued that the FPC's present sensitivity to the con-
sumer interest is in part due to the prodding of the Supreme Court.
That, I think, is true. But it in no way impairs my general point which
is that it is a mistake to isolate the institution of the administrative
agency from all of the other relevant forces and institutions, and then
to characterize it as inevitably the captive of certain interests. Even
a theory which accounts for agency action in terms of power must
take account of the fact that each agency operates within a complex
of powers which is peculiar to that agency, and that even for any single
agency there is rarely a single interest which can dominate. The Mari-
time Board, for example, which is indeed a power ridden agency, is at
least accessible to two sources of power—the unions and the shipping
owners.
The present day reformist, particularly the environmentalists,
look to the courts to achieve their aims. In the•New Deal days when
I first went into government the courts were looked at as inherently
the bulkwarks of reaction. We know that that was untrue and so should
have learned that such generalizations are likely to be wrong, includ-
ing the generalization that administrations are inherently reactionary
and at the beck and call of the interests. It is true that the work done
by the courts. in the last few years in the area of administrative law
has been of the greatest importance for the cause of reform. In a
period in which many of the agencies have settled into unenterprising
routines, the courts have set about to reawaken these agencies to their
responsibilities for active and forward-looking decisions. Particularly
significant are the decisions opening up the agency and judicial review
proceedings to the direct representation of consumer and citizen inter-
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ests. Theoretically these interests are in the keeping of the agencies
themselves. But bureaucracies tend to become somewhat ingrown,
attached to their own concepts of policy and resentful of outside pres-
sures, particularly those which they feel they can ignore.
The courts also have been broadly interpreting their law-making
powers through the vehicle of statutory interpretation, and have man-
dated more inclusive concepts of policy than the agencies were pre-
pared to accept. Perhaps we might say of the phenomenon that the
courts have a more general fund of prestige out of- which to build
novel theories, though agencies with bright new mandates have in the
past been as enterprising as the courts. These judicial activities con-
tinue to be of great importance in stimulating and guiding the agencies
in their new endeavors. But ultimately the conflict of interests which
lie at the bottom of most of the great controversies must be resolved
by the more particular political process represented by administrative
and legislative power. The courts are not equipped, for example, to
work out pollution control standards for the Delaware River Basin.
We are not entitled at this point to assume that because in the
past agencies have had little regard to environmental protection they
will continue in that way in the future. The political situation has
radically changed. There is now a large public demand which it would
be suicidal for the agencies to ignore and which finds expression in
important new legislation as well as in an aroused public opinion. To
such pressures the agencies responded in the past, and there are no
a priori reasons why they should not respond to such forces in the fu-
ture. This is not to say that every claim made by the environmentalist
will be accepted. There are real conflicts on every side of which there
are ranged great numbers of our citizenry. Pollution control is as much
as anything a matter of increased costs and it is the citizen who will
foot the bill.
The articles of this Symposium testify to the fact that however
we may estimate the value of the decisions taken by these agencies
they are not necessarily bogged down in routine or oblivious to new
problems. The article on the Federal Power Commission demonstrates
that once catapulted by the Supreme Court into the business of regu-
lating the producer price of natural gas, and having been criticized
by Dean Landis for their failure to respond to the challenge, they have
become most ingenious and flexible in designing theories to meet the
administrative load. The much maligned Federal Communications
Commission has been extremely active in the last few years. Given
the massive failure of Congress, for example, to provide guidance for
the resolution of the CATV problem, the Commission has put out an
enormous and continuing effort in dealing with this baffling and explo-
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sive issue. The continuing initiative of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, its ready response to old and new problems in the area
of investment, is highly encouraging. The National Labor Relations
Board, whatever ones feeling as to its biases, has not stood still.
These instances demonstrate that the independent agencies, just
as it is true of the departmental agencies, are capable of novel and
significant initiatives. When compared with the Congress they do not,
I think, come off a poor second; and it is difficult to argue that their
failures have been more drastic than those of either Congress or the
Executive. The courts today, of course, are the darlings of the liberals
but they have not always been so. In sum, any theory which attempts
to describe our administrative agencies, whether independent or de-
partmental, in tight or simplistic terms is doomed to fail. In any ulti-
mate sense they can only be understood as functions of our entire
system of government and evaluated in terms which are relevant to a
judgment of that system.
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